


**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT****Routing Slip**

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
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NSC review completed.

  
 Executive Secretary

11/16/82

Date

**SECRET****THE SENIOR INTERAGENCY GROUP - DEFENSE POLICY****(SIG - DP)****PROPOSED PLAN OF ACTION**

**Issue:** Proposed organization and agenda for SIG/IG on Defense Policy.

**Background:**

- October 26, 1982 memorandum from William P. Clark to SecDef states in part: "I feel that it will be desirable to utilize the SIG/DP to conduct a review of the FY 84-FY 88 defense program from a national security policy perspective."
- NSDD #2, January 1982, states the role and membership of the SIG/DP (copy attached).

**Proposal:** Schedule IG for Wednesday, November 10, from 1:30 to 3:00, to establish agenda and issue paper for SIG one week later, November 17.

**Membership:**

	<u>SIG</u>	<u>IG</u>	<u>Working Group</u>
DoD	DepSecDef (Chair)	VP or Chu (Chair)	Comptroller & Policy
NSC	William P. Clark	Boverie or Helm	To be determined
State	Kenneth Dam	Adm Howe	To be determined
CIA	William Casey	Adm Burkhalter	To be determined
CJCS	General Vessey	LGen Gorman	To be determined

**Agenda:** First meeting of IG next week will focus on the following:

- a. Better define the link between US foreign policy objectives and FY 84-88 defense objectives.
- b. Discuss how that link should be outlined and presented within the Executive Branch, Congress, and the public/media.
- c. This group will then agree on issues to be discussed further in the SIG one week later and prepare the appropriate agenda and issue paper by Monday, November 15.

**SECRET**

B223B

January 12, 1952

**B. The Senior Interagency Group — Defense Policy (SIG-DP)**

To advise and assist the NSC in exercising its authority and discharging its responsibility for defense policy and defense matters, the SIG-DP is established. The SIG-DP shall consist of the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Deputy or an Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Chairman); and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of other Departments and Agencies with responsibility for specific matters to be considered will attend on invitation by the Chairman.

**The SIG-DP will:**

1. Ensure that important defense policy issues requiring interagency attention receive full, prompt, and systematic consideration;
2. Deal with interdepartmental matters raised by any member or referred to it by subordinate interagency groups, or if such matters require higher-level consideration, report them to the Secretary of Defense for decision or referral to the NSC; and
3. Monitor the execution of approved policies and decisions.

A permanent secretariat, composed of personnel of the Department of Defense augmented as necessary by personnel provided in response to the Chairman's request by the Departments and Agencies represented on the SIG-DP, shall be established.

**C. The Senior Interagency Group — Intelligence (SIG-I)**

To advise and assist the NSC in exercising its authority and discharging its responsibility for intelligence policy and intelligence matters, the SIG-I is established. The SIG-I shall consist of Director of Central Intelligence (Chairman); the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Deputy Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of other Departments and Agencies will attend on invitation by the Chairman when such Departments and Agencies have a direct interest in intelligence activities under consideration.

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## Military Forces and U.S. Foreign Policy Goals

### I. What are the principal foreign policy goals that require military forces?

A. Protect critical U.S. interests against Soviet military coercion, especially in NATO, Southwest Asia, and the Pacific basin.

1. Contain any Warsaw Pact attack and maintain the territorial integrity of our NATO allies.

2. Preserve the West's access to the Persian Gulf region.

3. Maintain the security of the Northwest Pacific.

B. Provide strategic forces strong enough to deter nuclear attack on ourselves or our principal allies, while at the same time seeking meaningful and verifiable mutual reductions in nuclear weapons through negotiations with the Soviet Union.

### II. How do military forces contribute to the achievement of these goals?

A. Although we have specific regional objectives, we must recognize that if a conflict were to occur with the Soviet Union, it might be difficult to confine it to a single area. Thus, we must have sufficient airlift and sealift, and sufficient flexibility in our forces, to be able to reposition them as necessary. Central to this ability is a strong maritime component. Hence, this Administration proposes to expand the deployable battle fleet by 20 percent to 600 ships, and to provide for sufficient amphibious capability to lift \_\_\_\_\_.

B. To achieve our specific regional objectives, it has long been recognized that some forward deployment of U.S. forces is necessary. Not only does this provide a deterrent against surprise attack, but it saves the time and cost involved in transporting those forces to the theater. Thus, some forward deployment of U.S. forces is both cheaper and militarily more effective than maintaining all forces in the continental United States. Moreover, these forces serve as a visible reminder to our friends of our determination to stand with them, and thereby strengthen the cohesion of our alliances.

C. To meet our NATO goals, sufficient in-place units are required to deal with immediate Warsaw Pact forces in the Central Region of Europe, and sufficient reinforcing units to contain follow-on Pact forces. The United States contributes four in-place Army divisions and \_\_\_\_\_ Air Force squadrons, and is pledged to provide six reinforcing Army divisions and \_\_\_\_\_ Air Force squadrons within ten days of a decision to deploy. Our programs to preposition equipment for six Army divisions and \_\_\_\_\_ Air Force squadrons, together with the construction of facilities at Allied air bases, as well as the acquisition of enough airlift and tankers to deploy these forces, will achieve this reinforcing capability before the end of this decade. Three of the reinforcing divisions would be for the northern portion of the central front -- the traditional invasion route to Western Europe, and widely considered the weakest link in the present defense arrangement. The American reinforcements, together with improvements planned by our NATO Allies for this area, will correct that deficiency.

D. No defense of NATO could succeed if we fail to hold the flanks. On both the northern and southern flanks, forces from the nations involved will have principal responsibility for conducting a defense. But the U.S. -- like the Canadians -- will provide a brigade to assist in the defense of northern Norway. The U.S. will preposition equipment for a Marine brigade in Norway to meet that commitment.

E. To preserve the West's access to the Persian Gulf region, we must be ready to commit sufficient forces to deter a Soviet invasion. We believe that two Marine Corps, five Army divisions, and \_\_\_\_\_ Air Force squadrons would provide that deterrent. We have these basic forces available today, but we lack some of the required support units and unique support equipment, and we could not get the forces to the region in a timely manner. With the Army force structure, prepositioning and mobility improvements now planned, these problems should be corrected by the end of the decade.

F. In the Northwest Pacific we depend principally on forces of the individual nations to meet regional security requirements. This is particularly true of the Korean peninsula, where the U.S. has one Army division and \_\_\_\_\_ squadrons forward deployed in peacetime. No significant land forces are stationed in Japan, although \_\_\_\_\_ Air Force squadrons are deployed there.

G. To provide an adequate strategic deterrent, we must be capable of attacking the full range of targets, including hardened military targets. We must also ensure that we can attack the most significant targets in a variety of ways, to hedge against the failure of any one system. Strategic forces, after all, represent the nation's ultimate military force. We cannot afford to have them fail. Achieving these objectives will require substantial modernization of our present force, which has received little new investment since the late 1960s. We also believe that this modernization is essential to achieving meaningful mutual arms reduction. We must not repeat the mistake of the 1970s, when we hoped that negotiations could substitute for modernization. That policy left us without an acceptable agreement -- and without a modern force.

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